Polybius

Born in the Greek city-state of Arcadia, Polybius (ca. 203-122 B.C.E.) was set to become a leader of Achaean League. In the wake of Rome’s conquest of Macedonia, however, most of the leading Achaeans found themselves enslaved in Italy. Fortunately, Polybius found a protector in L. Aemilius Paulus, who hired him as tutor for his sons Scipio and Fabius in Rome. Polybius could thus travel in Rome’s highest circles and witness Roman military campaigns in the Mediterranean region as well as study their constitution. He praised Rome’s constitution but also worried that it might eventually succumb to internal strife.

“The Roman Polity,” from “The Histories,” Written about 150 BCE

The three kinds of government, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, were all found united in the Commonwealth of Rome. And so even was the balance between them all, and so regular the administration that resulted from their union, that it was no easy thing to determine with assurance, whether the entire state was to be estimated an aristocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy. For if they turned their view upon the power of the Consuls, the government appeared to be purely monarchical and regal. If, again, the authority of the Senate was considered, it then seemed to wear the form of aristocracy. And, lastly, if regard was to be had to the share which the Populus (people or masses) possessed in the administration of affairs, it could then scarcely fail to be denominated a popular state.

The several powers that were appropriated to each of these distinct branches of the constitution at the time of which we are speaking, and which, with very little variation, are even still preserved, are these: The Consuls, when they remain in Rome, before they lead out the armies into the field, are the masters of all public affairs. For all other magistrates, the tribunes alone excepted, are subject to them, and bound to obey their commands. They introduce ambassadors into the Senate. They propose also to the Senate the subjects of debates; and direct all forms that are observed in making the decrees. Nor is it less a part of their office likewise, to attend to those affairs that are transacted by the Populus; to call together general assemblies; to report to them the resolutions of the Senate; and to ratify whatever is determined by the greater number. In all the preparations that are made for war, as well as in the whole administration in the field, they possess an almost absolute authority. For to them it belongs to impose upon the allies whatever services they judge expedient; to appoint the military tribunes; to enroll the legions, and make the necessary levies, and to inflict punishments in the field, upon all that are subject to their command. Add to this, that they have the power likewise to expend whatever sums of money they may think convenient from the public treasury; being attended for that purpose by a quaestor, who is always ready to receive and execute their orders.

To the Senate belongs, in the first place, the sole care and management of the public money. For all returns that are brought into the treasury, as well as all the payments that are issued from it, are directed by their orders. Nor is it allowed to the quaestors to apply any part of the revenue to particular occasions as they arise, without a decree of the Senate; those sums alone excepted which are expended in the service of the Consuls. And even those more general, as well as greatest disbursements, which are employed at the return every five years, in building and repairing the public edifices, are assigned to the censors for that purpose, by the express permission of the Senate. To the Senate, also, is referred the cognizance of all the crimes, committed in any part of Italy, that demand a public examination and inquiry: such as treasons, conspiracies, poisonings, and assassinations. Add to this, that when any controversies arise, either between private men, or any of the cities of Italy, it is the part of the Senate to adjust all disputes; to censure those that are deserving of blame: and to yield assistance to those who stand in need of protection and defense. When any embassies are sent out of Italy; either to reconcile contending states; to offer exhortations and advice; or even, as it sometimes happens, to impose commands; to propose conditions of a treaty; or to make a denunciation of war; the care and conduct of all these transactions is entrusted wholly to the Senate. When any ambassadors also arrive in Rome, it is the Senate likewise that determines how they shall be received and treated, and what answer shall be given to their demands.

In all these things that have now been mentioned, the Populus has no share. What part is allotted the Populi? First, the Populus are the sole dispensers of rewards and punishments. The Populus, then, when any offences demand punishment, frequently condemn citizens to the payment of a fine: those especially who have been invested with the dignities of the state. To the Populus alone belongs the right to sentence any one to die. The public magistrates are elected also by the Populus. To the Populus belongs the power of approving or rejecting laws, and, which is still of greater importance, peace and war are likewise fixed by their deliberations. When any alliance is concluded, any war ended, or treaty made; to them the conditions are referred, and by them either annulled or ratified. The Populus again, on their part, are held in dependence on the Senate, both to the particular members, and to the general body. In every part of Italy there are works of various kinds, which are let to farm by the censors, such as the building or repairing of the public buildings, which are almost innumerable; the care of rivers, harbors, mines and lands; everything, in a word, that falls beneath the dominion of the Romans. In all these things the Populus are the undertakers: inasmuch as there are scarcely any to be found that are not in some way involved, either in the contracts, or in the management of the works. . . .

Thus, while each of these separate parts is enabled either to assist or obstruct the rest, the government, by the apt context of them all in the general frame, is so well secured against every accident, that it seems scarcely possible to invent a more perfect system. For when the dread of any common danger that threatens from abroad constrains all the orders of the state to unite and cooperate, such is the strength of the republic that no measures that are necessary are neglected. Thus the government, by the very form and peculiar nature of its constitution, is equally enabled to resist all attacks, and to accomplish every purpose. And, whenever either of the separate parts of the republic attempts to exceed its proper limits, excites contention and dispute, and struggles to obtain a greater share of power than that which is assigned to it by the laws, it is manifest that, since no one single part, as we have shown in this discourse, is in itself supreme or absolute, the part which thus aspires must soon be reduced again within its own just bounds, and not be suffered to insult or depress the rest. And thus the several orders, of which the state is framed, are forced always to maintain their due position: being partly counter-worked in their designs; and partly also restrained from making any attempt, by the dread of falling under that authority to which they are exposed.

**Source: Oliver J. Thatcher, ed., The Library of Original Sources(Milwaukee: University Research Extension Co., 1907), Vol. III:The Roman World , pp. 166-193